IPSEC.CONF(5) | Executable programs | IPSEC.CONF(5) |
NAME¶
ipsec.conf - IPsec configuration and connections
DESCRIPTION¶
The ipsec.conf file specifies most configuration and control information for the Libreswan IPsec subsystem. (The major exception is secrets for authentication; see ipsec.secrets(5).) Its contents are not security-sensitive. Configurations can be added using this configuration file or by using ipsec whack directly. This means that technically, the ipsec.conf file is optional, but a few warnings might show up when this file is missing.
ipsec.conf is a text file, consisting of one or more sections. White space followed by # followed by anything to the end of the line is a comment and is ignored, as are empty lines that are not within a section.
A line that contains include and a file name, separated by white space, is replaced by the contents of that file, preceded and followed by empty lines. If the file name is not a full pathname, it is considered to be relative to the directory that contains the including file. Such inclusions can be nested. Only a single filename may be supplied, and it may not contain white space, but it may include shell wildcards (see sh(1)); for example:
include /etc/ipsec.d/*.conf
The intention of the include facility is mostly to permit keeping information on connections, or sets of connections, separate from the main configuration file. This permits such connection descriptions to be changed, copied to the other security gateways involved, etc., without having to constantly extract them from the configuration file and then insert them back into it. Note also the also and alsoflip parameters (described below) which permit splitting a single logical section (e.g. a connection description) into several distinct sections.
The first significant line of the file may specify a version of this specification for backwards compatibility with freeswan and openswan. It is ignored and unused. For compatibility with openswan, specify:
version 2
A section begins with a line of the form:
type name
where type indicates what type of section follows, and name is an arbitrary name that distinguishes the section from others of the same type. (Names must start with a letter and may contain only letters, digits, periods, underscores, and hyphens.) All subsequent non-empty lines that begin with white space are part of the section; comments within a section must begin with white space too. There may be only one section of a given type with a given name.
Lines within the section are generally of the form
parameter=value
(note the mandatory preceding white space). There can be white space on either side of the =. Parameter names follow the same syntax as section names, and are specific to a section type. Unless otherwise explicitly specified, no parameter name may appear more than once in a section.
An empty value stands for the system default value (if any) of the parameter, i.e. it is roughly equivalent to omitting the parameter line entirely. A value may contain white space only if the entire value is enclosed in double quotes ("); a value cannot itself contain a double quote, nor may it be continued across more than one line.
Numeric values are specified to be either an “integer” (a sequence of digits) or a “decimal number” (sequence of digits optionally followed by `.' and another sequence of digits).
There is currently one parameter that is available in any type of section:
also
alsoflip
Parameter names beginning with x- (or X-, or x_, or X_) are reserved for user extensions and will never be assigned meanings by IPsec. Parameters with such names must still observe the syntax rules (limits on characters used in the name; no white space in a non-quoted value; no newlines or double quotes within the value). All other as-yet-unused parameter names are reserved for future IPsec improvements.
A section with name %default specifies defaults for sections of the same type. For each parameter in it, any section of that type that does not have a parameter of the same name gets a copy of the one from the %default section. There may be multiple %default sections of a given type, but only one default may be supplied for any specific parameter name. %default sections may not contain also or alsoflip parameters.
Currently there are two types of section: a config section specifies general configuration information for IPsec, while a conn section specifies an IPsec connection.
CONN SECTIONS¶
A conn section contains a connection specification, defining a network connection to be made using IPsec. The name given is arbitrary, and is used to identify the connection to ipsec_auto(8) Here's a simple example:
conn snt left=10.11.11.1 leftsubnet=10.0.1.0/24 leftnexthop=172.16.55.66 leftsourceip=10.0.1.1 right=192.168.22.1 rightsubnet=10.0.2.0/24 rightnexthop=172.16.88.99 rightsourceip=10.0.2.1 keyingtries=%forever
A note on terminology... In automatic keying, there are two kinds of communications going on: transmission of user IP packets, and gateway-to-gateway negotiations for keying, rekeying, and general control. The data path (a set of “IPsec SAs”) used for user packets is herein referred to as the “connection”; the path used for negotiations (built with “ISAKMP SAs”) is referred to as the “keying channel”.
To avoid trivial editing of the configuration file to suit it to each system involved in a connection, connection specifications are written in terms of left and right participants, rather than in terms of local and remote. Which participant is considered left or right is arbitrary; IPsec figures out which one it is being run on based on internal information. This permits using identical connection specifications on both ends. There are cases where there is no symmetry; a good convention is to use left for the local side and right for the remote side (the first letters are a good mnemonic).
Many of the parameters relate to one participant or the other; only the ones for left are listed here, but every parameter whose name begins with left has a right counterpart, whose description is the same but with left and right reversed.
Parameters are optional unless marked “(required)”
CONN PARAMETERS: GENERAL¶
The following parameters are relevant to IKE automatic keying. Unless otherwise noted, for a connection to work, in general it is necessary for the two ends to agree exactly on the values of these parameters.
keyexchange
hostaddrfamily
clientaddrfamily
type
left
There are several magic values. If it is %defaultroute, left will be filled in automatically with the local address of the default-route interface (as determined at IPsec startup time); this also overrides any value supplied for leftnexthop. (Either left or right may be %defaultroute, but not both.) The value %any signifies an address to be filled in (by automatic keying) during negotiation. The value %opportunistic signifies that both left and leftnexthop are to be filled in (by automatic keying) from DNS data for left's client. The value can also contain the interface name, which will then later be used to obtain the IP address from to fill in. For example %ppp0. The values %group and %opportunisticgroup makes this a policy group conn: one that will be instantiated into a regular or opportunistic conn for each CIDR block listed in the policy group file with the same name as the conn.
If using IP addresses in combination with NAT, always use the actual local machine's (NATed) IP address, and if the remote (eg right=) is NATed as well, the remote's public (not NATed) IP address. Note that this makes the configuration no longer symmetrical on both sides, so you cannot use an identical configuration file on both hosts.
leftsubnet
It supports two magic shorthands vhost: and vnet:, which can list subnets in the same syntax as virtual-private. The value %priv expands to the networks specified in virtual-private. The value %no means no subnet. A common use for allowing roadwarriors to come in on public IPs or via accepted NATed networks from RFC1918 is to use leftsubnet=vhost:%no,%priv. The vnet: option can be used to allow RFC1918 subnets without hardcoding them. When using vnet the connection will instantiate, allowing for multiple tunnels with different subnets.
leftsubnets
leftvti
leftaddresspool
When leftaddresspool= is specified, the connection may not specify either leftsubnet= or leftsubnets=. Address pools are fully allocated when the connection is loaded, so the ranges should be sane. For example, specifying a range rightaddresspool=10.0.0.0-11.0.0.0 will lead to massive memory allocation. Address pools specifying the exact same range are shared between different connections. Different addresspools should not be defined to partially overlap.
leftprotoport
To filter on specific icmp type and code, use the higher 8 bits for type and the lower 8 bits for port. For example, to allow icmp echo packets (type 8, code 0) the 'port' would be 0x0800, or 2048 in decimal, so you configure leftprotoport=icmp/2048. Similarly, to allow ipv6-icmp Neighbour Discovery which has type 136 (0x88) and code 0(0x00) this becomes 0x8800 or in decimal 34816 resulting in leftprotoport=ipv6-icmp/34816 .
Some clients, notably older Windows XP and some Mac OSX clients, use a random high port as source port. In those cases rightprotoport=17/%any can be used to allow all UDP traffic on the connection. Note that this option is part of the proposal, so it cannot be arbitrarily left out if one end does not care about the traffic selection over this connection - both peers have to agree. The Port Selectors show up in the output of ipsec eroute and ipsec auto --status eg:"l2tp": 193.110.157.131[@aivd.libreswan.org]:7/1701...%any:17/1701 This option only filters outbound traffic. Inbound traffic selection must still be based on firewall rules activated by an updown script. The variables $PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL, $PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL, $PLUTO_MY_PORT, and $PLUTO_PEER_PORT are available for use in updown scripts. Older workarounds for bugs involved a setting of 17/0 to denote any single UDP port (not UDP port 0). Some clients, most notably OSX, uses a random high port, instead of port 1701 for L2TP.
leftnexthop
leftsourceip
leftupdown
leftupdown="ipsec _updown --route yes"
To disable calling an updown script, set it to the empty string, eg leftupdown="" or leftupdown="%disabled".
See ipsec_pluto(8) for details. Relevant only locally, other end need not agree on it.
leftcat
leftfirewall
If one or both security gateways are doing forwarding firewalling (possibly including masquerading), and this is specified using the firewall parameters, tunnels established with IPsec are exempted from it so that packets can flow unchanged through the tunnels. (This means that all subnets connected in this manner must have distinct, non-overlapping subnet address blocks.) This is done by the default updown script (see ipsec_pluto(8)).
The implementation of this makes certain assumptions about firewall setup, and the availability of the Linux Advanced Routing tools. In situations calling for more control, it may be preferable for the user to supply his own updown script, which makes the appropriate adjustments for his system.
CONN PARAMETERS: AUTOMATIC KEYING¶
The following parameters are relevant to automatic keying via IKE. Unless otherwise noted, for a connection to work, in general it is necessary for the two ends to agree exactly on the values of these parameters.
auto
The option ondemand used to be called route
authby
If asymmetric authentication is requested, IKEv2 must be enabled, and the options leftauth= and rightauth= should be used instead of authby.
For IKEv1, SHA2 based signatures are not defined and ECDSA is not implemented, so the default authby= value is rsa-sha1. Using authby=rsasig results in only rsa-sha1 as well. For IKEv2, using authby=rsasig means using rsa-sha2_512, rsa-sha2_384, rsa-sha2_256 and rsa-sha1, where rsa-sha1 will used only if RFC 7427 is not supported by the peer.
As per RFC 8221, authby=rsa-sha1 is only supported in the old style, meaning RSA-PKCSv1.5. The SHA2 variants are only supported for the new style of RFC 7427, so authby=rsa-sha2 will use the new style. The default authby= will remove rsa-sha1 in the near future. It is strongly recommended that if certificates are used, the certificates and the authby= signature methods used are the same, as it increases interoperability and keeps the authentication of everything within one digital signature system.
Digital signatures are superior in every way to shared secrets. Especially IKEv1 in Aggressive Mode is vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks and is performed routinely by at least the NSA on monitored internet traffic globally. The never option is only used for connections that do not actually start an IKE negotiation, such as type=passthrough connections. The auth method null is used for "anonymous opportunistic IPsec" and should not be used for regular pre-configured IPsec VPNs.
ike
The format is "cipher-hash;modpgroup, cipher-hash;modpgroup, ..." Any omitited option will be filled in with all allowed default values. Multiple proposals are separated by a comma. If an ike= line is specified, no other received proposals will be accepted than those specified on the IKE line. Some examples are ike=3des-sha1,aes-sha1, ike=aes, ike=aes_ctr, ike=aes_gcm256-sha2, ike=aes128-md5;modp2048, ike=aes256-sha2;dh19, ike=aes128-sha1;dh22, ike=3des-md5;modp1024,aes-sha1;modp1536.
IKEv2 allows combining elements into a single proposal. These can be specified by using the + symbol. An example is: ike=aes_gcm+chacha20_poly1305;dh14+dh19,aes+3des-sha2+sha1;dh14. Note that AEAD algorithms (aes_gcm, aes_ccm, chacha20_poly1305) and non-AEAD algorithms (aes, 3des) cannot be combined into a single proposal. To support aes and aes_gcm, two proposals separated by a comma must be used.
The default IKE proposal depends on the version of libreswan used. It follow the recommendations of RFC4306, RFC7321 and as of this writing their successor draft documents RFC4306bis and RFC7321bis. As for libreswan 3.32, SHA1 and MODP1536(dh5) are still allowed per default for backwards compatibility, but 3DES and MODP1024(dh2) are not allowed per default. As of libreswan 4.x, modp1024(dh2) support is no longer compiled in at all. For IKEv2, the defaults include AES, AES-GCM, DH14 and stronger, and SHA2. The default key size is 256 bits. The default AES_GCM ICV is 16 bytes.
Note that AES-GCM is an AEAD algorithm, meaning that it performs encryption+authentication in one step. This means that AES-GCM must not specify an authentication algorithm. However, for IKE it does require a PRF function, so the second argument to an AEAD algorithm denotes the PRF. So ike=aes_gcm-sha2 means propose AES_GCM with SHA2 as the prf. Note that for phase2alg, there is no prf, so AES-GCM is specified for ESP as esp=aes_gcm-null. The AES-GCM and AES-CCM algorithms support 8,12 and 16 byte ICV's. These can be specified using a postfix, for example aes_gcm_a (for 8), aes_gcm_b (for 12) and aes_gcm_c (for 16). The default (aes_gcm without postfix) refers to the 16 byte ICV version. It is strongly recommended to NOT use the 8 or 12 byte versions of GCM or CCM. These versions are NOT included in the default and will be removed in a future version, following the recommendation of RFC 8247 or it successor.
Weak algorithms are regularly removed from libreswan. Currently, 1DES and modp768(DH1) have been removed and modp1024(DH2) has been disabled at compile time. Additionally, MD5 and SHA1 will be removed within the next few years. Null encryption is available, and should only be used for testing or benchmarking purposes. Please do not request for insecure algorithms to be re-added to libreswan. IKEv1 has been disabled per default, and will soon no longer be compiled in by default.
For all Diffie-Hellman groups, the "dh" keyword can be used instead of the "modp" keyword. For example ike=3des-sha1;dh19. Diffie-Hellman groups 19,20 and 21 from RFC-5903 are supported. Curve25519 from RFC-8031 is supported as "dh31". Curve448 and GOST DH groups are not yet supported in libreswan because these are not supported yet in the NSS crypto library.
Diffie-Hellman groups 22, 23 and 24 from RFC-5114 are implemented but not compiled in by default. These DH groups are extremely controversial and MUST NOT be used unless forced (administratively) by the other party. This is further documented in RFC 8247, but the summary is that it cannot be proven that these DH groups do not contain a cryptographic trapdoor (a backdoor by the USG who provided these primes without revealing the seeds and generation process used).
The modp syntax will be removed in favour of the dh syntax in the future
phase2
The very first IPsec designs called for use of AH plus ESP to offer authentication, integrity and confidentiality. That dual protocol use was a significant burden, so ESP was extended to offer all three services, and AH remained as an auth/integ. The old mode of ah+esp is no longer supported in compliance with RFC 8221 Section 4. Additionally, AH does not play well with NATs, so it is strongly recommended to use ESP with the null cipher if you require unencrypted authenticated transport.
phase2alg
sha2-truncbug
This option enables using the draft 96 bits version to interop with those implementations. Currently the accepted values are no, (the default) signifying default RFC truncation of 128 bits, or yes, signifying the draft 96 bits truncation.
Another workaround is to switch from sha2_256 to sha2_128 or sha2_512.
ms-dh-downgrade
dns-match-id
require-id-on-certificate
ppk
nat-ikev1-method
This option allows fine tuning which of the NAT-T payloads to consider for sending and processing. Currently the accepted values are drafts, rfc, both (the default) and none. To interoperate with known broken devices, use nat-ikev1-method=drafts. To prevent the other end from triggering IKEv1 NAT-T encapsulation, set this to none. This will omit the NAT-T payloads used to determine NAT, forcing the other end not to use encapsulation.
esp
ESP = PROPOSAL[,PROPOSAL...] PROPOSAL = ENCRYPT_ALGS[-INTEG_ALGS[-DH_ALGS]] ENCRYPT_ALGS = ENCRYPT_ALG[+ENCRYPT_ALG...] INTEG_ALGS = INTEG_ALG[+INTEG_ALG...] DH_ALGS = DH_ALG[+DH_ALG...]
During startup, ipsec_pluto(8) will log all supported ESP algorithms.
Specifying the DH algorithms explicitly is not recommended. When PFS is enabled, and the DH algorithms are omitted, each PROPOSAL will automatically include the DH algorithm negotiated during the IKE exchange.
AEAD algorithms such as AES_GCM and AES_CCM no not require a separate integrity algorithm. For example esp=aes_gcm256 or esp=aes_ccm.
For instance:
esp=aes_gcm,aes128+aes256-sha2_512+sha2_256-dh14+dh19 esp=aes128-sha2_512-dh14+dh19
If not specified, a secure set of defaults will be used. The program:
ipsec algparse esp=...
can be used to query these defaults.
ah
AH = PROPOSAL[,PROPOSAL...] PROPOSAL = INTEG_ALGS[-DH_ALGS] INTEG_ALGS = INTEG_ALG[+INTEG_ALG...] DH_ALGS = DH_ALG[+DH_ALG...]
During startup, ipsec_pluto(8) will log all supported AH algorithms.
Specifying the DH algorithms explicitly is not recommended. When PFS is enabled, and the DH algorithms are omitted, each PROPOSAL will automatically include the DH algorithm negotiated during the IKE exchange.
The default is not to use AH. If for some (invalid) reason you still think you need AH, please use esp with the null encryption cipher instead.
For instance:
ah=sha2_256+sha2_512 ah=sha2_256+sha2_512-dh14+dh19
If not specified, a secure set of defaults will be used. The program:
ipsec algparse ah=...
can be used to query these defaults.
fragmentation
IKEv1 fragmentation capabilities are negotiated via a well-known private vendor id. IKEv2 fragmentation support is implemented using RFC 7383. If pluto does not receive the fragmentation payload, no IKE fragments will be sent, regardless of the fragmentation= setting. When set to yes, IKE fragmentation will be attempted on the first re-transmit of an IKE packet of a size larger then 576 bytes for IPv4 and 1280 bytes for IPv6. If fragmentation is set to force, IKE fragmentation is used on initial transmits of such sized packets as well. When we have received IKE fragments for a connection, pluto behaves as if in force mode.
ikepad
IKE padding is allowed in IKEv1 but has been known to cause interoperability issues. The ikepad= option can be used to disable IKEv1 padding. This used to be required for some devices (such as Checkpoint in Aggressive Mode) that reject padded IKEv1 packets. A bug was fixed in libreswan 3.25 that applied wrong IKE padding in XAUTH, so it is suspected that Checkpoint padding issue bas been resolved. And this option should not be needed by anyone. In IKEv2, no padding is allowed, and this option has no effect. If you find a device that seems to require IKE padding, please contact the libreswan developers. This option should almost never be enabled and might be removed in a future version.
ikev2
mobike
VTI and MOBIKE might not work well when used together.
esn
If replay-window is set to 0, ESN is disabled as some (most?) IPsec stacks won't support ESN in such a configuration.
decap-dscp
nopmtudisc
narrowing
There are security implications in allowing narrowing down the proposal. For one, what should be done with packets that we hoped to tunnel, but cannot. Should these be dropped or send in the clear? Second, this could cause thousands of narrowed down Child SAs to be created if the conn has a broad policy (eg 0/0 to 0/0). One possible good use case scenario is that a remote end (that you fully trust) allows you to define a 0/0 to them, while adjusting what traffic you route via them, and what traffic remains outside the tunnel. However, it is always preferred to setup the exact tunnel policy you want, as this will be much clearer to the user.
sareftrack
nic-offload
leftid
When using certificate based ID's, one need to specify the full RDN, optionally using wildcard matching (eg CN='*'). If the RDN contains a comma, this can be masked using a comma (eg OU='Foo,, Bar and associates')
leftrsasigkey
leftcert
leftckaid
leftauth
Asymmetric authentication is only supported with IKEv2. If symmetric authentication is required, use authby= instead of leftauth and rightauth. If leftauth is set, rightauth must also be set and authby= must not be set. Asymmetric authentication cannot use secret (psk) on one side and null on the other side - use psk on both ends instead.
When using EAPONLY authentication, which omits the regular IKEv2 AUTH payload, leftauth= (or rightauth=) should be set to eaponly.
Be aware that the symmetric keyword is authby= but the asymmetric keyword is leftauth and rightauth (without the "by").
leftautheap
The EAP authentication mechanisms are only available for IKEv2 based connections.
leftca
leftikeport
leftsendcert
leftxauthserver
leftxauthclient
leftusername
leftmodecfgserver
leftmodecfgclient
xauthby
username:password:conname:ipaddress
For supported password hashing methods, see crypt(3). If pluto is running in FIPS mode, some hash methods, such as MD5, might not be available. Threads are used to launch an xauth authentication helper for file as well as PAM methods.
The alwaysok should only be used if the XAUTH user authentication is not really used, but is required for interoperability, as it defeats the whole point of XAUTH which is to rely on a secret only known by a human. See also pam-authorize=yes
xauthfail
pam-authorize
modecfgpull
modecfgdns, modecfgdomains, modecfgbanner
The modecfgdns option takes a comma or space separated list of IP addresses that can be used for DNS resolution. The modecfgdomains option takes a comma or space separated list of internal domain names that are reachable via the supplied modecfgdns DNS servers.
The IKEv1 split tunnel directive will be sent automatically if the xauth server side has configured a network other than 0.0.0.0/0. For IKEv2, this is automated via narrowing.
remote-peer-type
nm-configured
encapsulation
enable-tcp
tcp-remoteport
nat-keepalive
initial-contact
cisco-unity
ignore-peer-dns
accept-redirect
accept-redirect-to
The value of this option is not considered at all if accept-redirect is set to no.
send-redirect
redirect-to
fake-strongswan
send-vendorid
Vendor ID's can be useful in tracking interoperability problems. However, specific vendor identification and software versions can be useful to an attacker when there are known vulnerabilities to a specific vendor/version.
The prefix OE stands for "Opportunistic Encryption". This prefix was historically used by The FreeS/WAN Project and The Openswan Project (openswan up to version 2.6.38) and in one Xeleranized openswan versions (2.6.39). Further Xeleranized openswan's use the prefix OSW.
overlapip
Note that connection instances created by the Opportunistic Encryption or PKIX (x.509) instantiation system are distinct internally. They will inherit this policy bit.
The default is no.
This feature is only available with kernel drivers that support SAs to overlapping conns. At present only the (klips) mast protocol stack supports this feature.
reqid
Automatically generated reqids use a range of 0-3 (eg 16380-16383 for the first reqid). These are used depending on the exact policy (AH, AH+ESP, IPCOMP, etc).
WARNING: Manually assigned reqids are all identical. Instantiations of connections (those using %any wildcards) will all use the same reqid. If you use manual assigning you should make sure your connections only match single road warrior only or you break multiple road warriors behind same NAT router because this feature requires unique reqids to work.
dpddelay
dpdtimeout
dpdaction
dpdaction=clear is really only useful on the server of a Road Warrior config.
The value restart_by_peer has been obsoleted and its functionality moved into the regular restart action.
pfs
pfsgroup
aggressive
Aggressive Mode is less secure, and more vulnerable to Denial Of Service attacks. It is also vulnerable to brute force attacks with software such as ikecrack. It should not be used, and it should especially not be used with XAUTH and group secrets (PSK). If the remote system administrator insists on staying irresponsible, enable this option.
Aggressive Mode is further limited to only proposals with one DH group as there is no room to negotiate the DH group. Therefore it is mandatory for Aggressive Mode connections that both ike= and phase2alg= options are specified with only one fully specified proposal using one DH group.
The KE payload is created in the first exchange packet when using aggressive mode. The KE payload depends on the DH group used. This is why there cannot be multiple DH groups in IKEv1 aggressive mode. In IKEv2, which uses a similar method to IKEv1 Aggressive Mode, there is an INVALID_KE response payload that can inform the initiator of the responder's desired DH group and so an IKEv2 connection can actually recover from picking the wrong DH group by restarting its negotiation.
salifetime
The keywords "keylife" and "lifetime" are obsoleted aliases for "salifetime." Change your configs to use "salifetime" instead.
ipsec-max-bytes
An IPsec SA contains two keys, one for inbound and one for outbound traffic. The ipsec-max-bytes sets two limits on each of these keys: the hard limit which is the total number of bytes that a given key can encrypt, and the soft limit which is the number of bytes that can be encrypted before a renegotiation of the IPsec SA is initiated. Normally the renegotation (via the IKE SA) is completed before the ipsec-max-bytes value is reached.
Pluto sets the the original initiator's soft limit to 25% of ipsec-max-bytes (with 12% fuzz) and on the original responder's soft limit to 50% of ipsec-max-bytes (with 12% fuzz). This way the original initiator hopefully is the one initiating the renegotiation of the IPsec SA.
This option is not negotiated between IKE peers. Each end of the IPsec SA sets their own limits independently.
The default (hard limit) is 2^63 bytes. The original initiator's soft limit is 2^61 bytes (approx.) and the original responder's soft limit is 2^62 bytes (approx.).
ipsec-max-packets
Default values and caveats are the same as for ipsec-max-bytes. This option uses a prefix without "B" for bytes.
replay-window
A value of 0 disables replay protection. Disabling of replay protection is sometimes used on a pair of IPsec servers in a High Availability setup, or on servers with very unpredictable latency, such as mobile networks, which can cause an excessive amount of out of order packets.
Disabling replay protection will also disable Extended Sequence Numbers (esn=no), as advise from RFC 4303 caused some stacks to not support ESN without a replay-window.
Note: on Linux, sequence errors can be seen in /proc/net/xfrm_stat.
Note: the BSD setkey utility displays the replay window size in bytes (8 packets per byte) and not packets.
Technically, at least the Linux kernel can install IPsec SA's with an IPsec SA Sequence Number, but this is currently not supported by libreswan.
rekey
rekeymargin
rekeyfuzz
keyingtries
ikelifetime
retransmit-timeout
retransmit-interval
compress
For IKEv1, compress settings on both peers must match. For IKEv2, compression can only be suggested and a mismatched compress setting results in connection without compression.
When set to yes, compression is negotiated for the DEFLATE compression algorithm.
metric
mtu
tfc
send-no-esp-tfc
nflog
mark
mark-in
mark-out
vti-interface
VTI interfaces are currently only supported on Linux with XFRM. The _updown script handles certain Linux specific interfaces settings required for proper functioning (disable_policy, rp_filter, forwarding, etc). Interface names are limited to 16 characters and may not allow all characters to be used. If marking and vti-routing=yes is used, no manual iptables should be required. However, administrators can use the iptables mangle table to mark traffic manually if desired.
vti-routing
vti-shared
ipsec-interface
The ipsec-interface is used to route outbound traffic that needs to be encrypted, and will decrypt inbound traffic that arrives on this interface. All traffic that is routed to this interface will be automatically encrypted providing the IPsec SA policy covers this traffic. Traffic not matching the IPsec SA will be dropped. Tools such as tcpdump, iptables, ifconfig and tools that need traffic counters can be used on all cleartext pre-encrypt and post-decrypt traffic on the device. When leftsubnet= is equal to rightsubnet=, the routing needs to be manged by an external routing daemon or manually by the administrator.
This option is currently only supported on Linux kernels 4.19 or later when compiled with XFRMi support (CONFIG_XFRM_INTERFACE). The number of the ipsecX device corresponds with the XFRM IF_ID policy option of the IPsec SA in the Linux kernel. On Linux, XFRMi interfaces can be managed by libreswan automatically or can be preconfigured on the system using the existing init system or via networking tools such as systemd-networkd and NetworkManager. The _updown script handles certain Linux specific interfaces settings required for proper functioning, such as forwarding and routing rules for IPsec traffic.
The ipsec-interface=0 will create an interface with the same name as the old KLIPS interface, ipsec0. This interface name should only be used when required for migration from KLIPS to XFRM interfaces. Since XFRM IF_ID and marking cannot use 0, this is mapped to 16384. This means that the devices ipsec0 and ipsec16384 cannot both be in use.
interface-ip=
priority
XFRM use a priority system based on "most specific match first". It uses an internal algorithm to calculate these based on network prefix length, protocol and port selectors. A lower value means a higher priority.
Typical values are about the 2000 range. These can be seen on the XFRM stack using ip xfrm policy when the connection is up. For "anonymous IPsec" or Opportunistic Encryption based connections, a much lower priority (65535) is used to ensure administrator configured IPsec always takes precedence over opportunistic IPsec.
sendca
labeled-ipsec
policy-label
failureshunt
negotiationshunt
CONFIG SECTIONS¶
At present, the only config section known to the IPsec software is the one named setup, which contains information used when the software is being started (see ipsec_setup(8)). Here's an example:
config setup logfile=/var/log/pluto.log plutodebug=all
Parameters are optional unless marked “(required)”.
The currently-accepted parameter names in a config setup section are:
protostack
listen
ike-socket-bufsize
ike-socket-errqueue
listen-udp
listen-tcp
nflog-all
keep-alive
virtual-private
Note: It seems that T-Mobile in the US and Rogers/Fido in Canada have started using 25.0.0.0/8 as their pre-NAT range. This range technically belongs to the Defence Interoperable Network Services Authority (DINSA), an agency of the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom. The network range seems to not have been announced for decades, which is probably why these organisations "borrowed" this range. To support roadwarriors on these 3G networks, you might have to add it to the virtual-private= line.
myvendorid
nhelpers
seedbits
ikev1-secctx-attr-type
ikev1-policy
crlcheckinterval
crl-strict
curl-iface
curl-timeout
ocsp-enable
ocsp-strict
The strict mode refers to the NSS ocspMode_FailureIsVerificationFailure mode, while non-strict mode refers to the NSS ocspMode_FailureIsNotAVerificationFailure mode.
ocsp-method
ocsp-timeout
ocsp-uri
ocsp-trustname
ocsp-cache-size
ocsp-cache-min-age
ocsp-cache-max-age
syslog
plutodebug
The current option values are base that represents moderate amounts of information, cpu-usage for getting timing/load based information (best used without any other debugging options), crypt for all crypto related operations and tmi (Too Much Information) for excessive logging. To log any sensitive private key or password material, use the special private value.
The old plutodebug options (control, controlmore, x509, kernel, etc) are mapped to either base or tmi. Note that all maps to base and not tmi.
uniqueids
When the connection is defined to be a server (using xauthserver=) and the connection policy is authby=secret, this option is ignored (as of 3.20) and old connections will never be replaced. This situation is commonly known as clients using a "Group ID".
This option may disappear in the near future. People using identical X.509 certificates on multiple devices are urged to upgrade to use separate certificates per client and device.
logfile
logappend
logip
audit-log
logtime
ddos-mode
ddos-ike-threshold
global-redirect
global-redirect-to
max-halfopen-ike
shuntlifetime
xfrmlifetime
dumpdir
statsbin
ipsecdir
passwd
nsspassword
policies/
cacerts/
crls/
When SELinux runs in enforced mode, changing this requires a similar change in the SELinux policy for the pluto daemon.
nssdir
pkcs11.txt
cert9.db
key4.db
When SELinux runs in enforced mode, changing this requires a similar change in the SELinux policy for the pluto daemon.
secretsfile
seccomp
The current default is disabled, but it is expected that in the future this feature will be enabled on all supported operating systems. Similarly, it is expected that further privilege separation will reduce the allowed syscalls - for example for the crypto helpers or DNS helpers.
Warning: The restrictions of pluto are inherited by the updown scripts, so these scripts are also not allowed to use syscalls that are forbidden for pluto.
This feature can be tested using ipsec whack --seccomp-crashtest. Warning: With seccomp=enabled, pluto will be terminated by the kernel. With seccomp=tolerant or seccomp=disabled, pluto will report the results of the seccomp test. SECCOMP will log the forbidden syscall numbers to the audit log, but only with seccomp=enabled. The tool scmp_sys_resolver from the libseccomp development package can be used to translate the syscall number into a name. See programs/pluto/pluto_seccomp.c for the list of allowed syscalls.
dnssec-enable
dnssec-rootkey-file
dnssec-anchors
OPPORTUNISTIC CONNS¶
For Opportunistic connections, the system requires creating special named conns that are used to implement the default policy groups. Currently, these names cannot be changed.
conn clear type=passthrough authby=never left=%defaultroute right=%group auto=route conn clear-or-private type=passthrough left=%defaultroute leftid=%myid right=%opportunisticgroup failureshunt=passthrough keyingtries=3 ikelifetime=1h salifetime=1h rekey=no auto=route conn private-or-clear type=tunnel left=%defaultroute leftid=%myid right=%opportunisticgroup failureshunt=passthrough keyingtries=3 ikelifetime=1h salifetime=1h rekey=no auto=route conn private type=tunnel left=%defaultroute leftid=%myid right=%opportunisticgroup failureshunt=drop keyingtries=3 ikelifetime=1h salifetime=1h rekey=no auto=route conn block type=reject authby=never left=%defaultroute right=%group auto=route
These conns will only work if %defaultroute works. The leftid will be the interfaces IP address by default, but it can also be set to %fromcert or use a DNS name.
POLICY GROUP FILES¶
The optional files under /etc/ipsec.d/policies, including
/etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear /etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear-or-private /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private-or-clear /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private /etc/ipsec.d/policies/block
may contain policy group configuration information to supplement ipsec.conf. Their contents are not security-sensitive.
These files are text files. Each consists of a list of CIDR blocks, one per line. White space followed by # followed by anything to the end of the line is a comment and is ignored, as are empty lines.
A connection in ipsec.conf that has right=%group or right=%opportunisticgroup is a policy group connection. When a policy group file of the same name is loaded at system start, the connection is instantiated such that each CIDR block serves as an instance's right value. The system treats the resulting instances as normal connections.
For example, given a suitable connection definition private, and the file /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private with an entry 192.0.2.3, the system creates a connection instance private#192.0.2.3. This connection inherits all details from private, except that its right client is 192.0.2.3.
DEFAULT POLICY GROUPS¶
The standard Libreswan install includes several policy groups which provide a way of classifying possible peers into IPsec security classes: private (talk encrypted only), private-or-clear (prefer encryption), clear-or-private (respond to requests for encryption), clear and block.
CHOOSING A CONNECTION [THIS SECTION IS EXTREMELY OUT OF DATE¶
When choosing a connection to apply to an outbound packet caught with a %trap, the system prefers the one with the most specific eroute that includes the packet's source and destination IP addresses. Source subnets are examined before destination subnets. For initiating, only routed connections are considered. For responding, unrouted but added connections are considered.
When choosing a connection to use to respond to a negotiation that doesn't match an ordinary conn, an opportunistic connection may be instantiated. Eventually, its instance will be /32 -> /32, but for earlier stages of the negotiation, there will not be enough information about the client subnets to complete the instantiation.
FILES¶
/etc/ipsec.conf /etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear /etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear-or-private /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private-or-clear /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private /etc/ipsec.d/policies/block
SEE ALSO¶
HISTORY¶
Designed for the FreeS/WAN project <https://www.freeswan.org> by Henry Spencer.
BUGS¶
Before reporting new bugs, please ensure you are using the latest version of Libreswan.
When type or failureshunt is set to drop or reject, Libreswan blocks outbound packets using eroutes, but assumes inbound blocking is handled by the firewall. Libreswan offers firewall hooks via an “updown” script. However, the default ipsec _updown provides no help in controlling a modern firewall.
Including attributes of the keying channel (authentication methods, ikelifetime, etc.) as an attribute of a connection, rather than of a participant pair, is dubious and incurs limitations.
The use of %any with the protoport= option is ambiguous. Should the SA permits any port through or should the SA negotiate any single port through? The first is a basic conn with a wildcard. The second is a template. The second is the current behaviour, and it's wrong for quite a number of uses involving TCP. The keyword %one may be introduced in the future to separate these two cases.
It would be good to have a line-continuation syntax, especially for the very long lines involved in RSA signature keys.
The ability to specify different identities, authby, and public keys for different automatic-keyed connections between the same participants is misleading; this doesn't work dependably because the identity of the participants is not known early enough. This is especially awkward for the “Road Warrior” case, where the remote IP address is specified as 0.0.0.0, and that is considered to be the “participant” for such connections.
If conns are to be added before DNS is available, left=FQDN, leftnextop=FQDN, and leftrsasigkey=%dnsonload will fail. ipsec_pluto(8) does not actually use the public key for our side of a conn but it isn't generally known at a add-time which side is ours (Road Warrior and Opportunistic conns are currently exceptions).
The myid option does not affect explicit ipsec auto --add or ipsec auto --replace commands for implicit conns.
AUTHOR¶
Paul Wouters
04/11/2024 | libreswan |